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LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORP. (AMTRAK): ANOTHER
MISAPPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM
DOCTRINE
Freedom of thought and speech has been described as "the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom."1 Nonetheless, the First Amendment right to free
speech,2 although long considered essential to the maintenance
of our democratic society,3 is not absolute.4 When confronted
with a potentially impermissible proscription on the right to free
' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J., explaining impor-
tance of free speech), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
(overruling Palko insofar as it was inconsistent with finding that Double Jeopardy
Clause of Fifth Amendment applied to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
' U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech...." Id.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982). Free speech is described as especially important in a democratic society:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that
unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as
fair, dangerous as well as safe, unAmerican as well as American.... The
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the pro-
gram of self-government.... It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.
Id.; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) (asserting that value of free speech is its usefulness in
checking abuse of power by public officials), reprinted in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
A COLLECTION OF BEST WRITINGS 295 (Kent Middleton & Roy M. Mersky eds.,
1981).
" Certain categories of speech have been deemed less essential to our political
process and, therefore, historically have been afforded less protection than other
forms of speech. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornogra-
phy); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to riot); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
(libel); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). Such
speech is deemed to be "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality." Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers and Economic Liberties, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 461 (1995).
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speech, courts engage in a categorical analysis to determine the
appropriate level of First Amendment protection warranted
based on the classification of the speaker's chosen forum.5
Known as the public forum doctrine, this analysis classifies
three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the designated
public forum, or the non-public forum. The term, "traditional
public forum," stands for the notion that "streets and parks ...
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and ... have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."' In
this forum, speech receives its greatest protection. Any govern-
mental attempts to restrict speech in a traditional public forum
must withstand a strict scrutiny analysis requiring the govern-
ment to assert a compelling state interest.7 Public property
which has not traditionally been considered a public forum, but
which the government has made available to the public for ex-
pressive activity, constitutes a "designated public forum."' Gov-
ernmental restrictions on speech made in a forum that is en-
dowed with this "open" character will require the government to
meet the same standards applicable to a traditional public fo-
rum.9 Government property which has not been held out as an
arena for expression is classified as a nonpublic forum." In such
a forum, the state may regulate speech, as long as the regulation
is reasonable and not based on the viewpoint expressed by the
speaker."
" The term "public forum" was first used by the Supreme Court in Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Its precise meaning,
however, remained largely unknown until the Supreme Court elaborated on it in
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
6 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The Perry court stated:
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end .... The State may also enforce regula-
tions of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Id.
, Id.; see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intl v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d
1144, 1151 (7th Cir. 1995) (indicating that government may open property up for "all
expressive activity ... [o~r ... for more limited purposes such as use by certain
groups, ... or discussion of certain subjects.").
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
'o Id. at 46-49.
" Id. at 46.
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It is a basic precept of the public forum doctrine that, re-
gardless of the forum chosen by a speaker, the government is
prohibited from silencing that speaker due to governmental dis-
pleasure with the message conveyed.' Recently, in Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak)," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Amtrak, a gov-
ernment entity,4 could constitutionally refuse to run a paid ad-
vertisement criticizing the political views of the makers of Coors
beer. '
In Lebron, Michael A. Lebron, 6 plaintiff, contracted with
12 Id. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). John Stuart Mill condemned such silenc-
ing, espoused free exchange of ideas, and denounced governmental suppression of
those ideas as a deprivation of "the opportunity to exchange error for truth." JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (1859). Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919), adopted Mill's position. Holmes
stated that, "the ultimate good desired [truth] is better reached by free trade in
ideas [and] the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market...." Id. at 630. Since Holmes enunciated his theory of
the "marketplace of ideas," courts, litigators, and commentators have relied upon it
for the proposition that the silencing of speech is an impermissible limit to the free
flow of ideas necessary to preserve our democratic government. Alan Howard, City
of Ladue v. Gilleo: Content Discrimination and the Right to Participate in Public
Debate, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 349, 353 (1995).
"3 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996). This was an
appeal from the lower court decision, in Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
(Amtrak), 811 F. Supp 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Lebron, 69 F.3d at 650.
14 Amtrak is a "government controlled and financed railroad" with facilities
"used daily by thousands of people." Lebron, 69 F.3d at 658. The federal government
established the railroad to pursue federal governmental objectives. Lebron v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 115 S. Ct. 961, 973 (1995). Additionally, the gov-
ernment now controls the Railroad's Board of Directors and subsidizes its losses. Id.
at 967.
This case has an interesting procedural history. Initially, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Lebron's First
Amendment rights had been violated by Amtrak's refusal to display his advertise-
ment. Lebron, 811 F. Supp. at 1005. On appeal, the Second Circuit, reversed on the
ground that Amtrak was not a government entity and, therefore, no claim of state
action could arise from its acts. Lebron, 12 F.3d 388 (1993). The United States Su-
preme Court, addressing only the narrow issue of whether Amtrak could be consid-
ered a government entity, held that Amtrak was a governmental actor for the pur-
poses of public forum doctrine analysis. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 974-75. The Court
declined, however, to decide the central issue regarding Lebron's free speech claim
and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to make that determination. Id. at
974-75. The Second Circuit's opinion on remand is the focus of this Comment.
"Lebron, 69 F.3d at 660.
'6 Lebron described himself as "an artist. I do work using photography, graph-
ics, and text to describe personal observations about social or political issues." Rob-
ert Neuwirth, Id Rather Do Art Than Buy a Jaguar, The New York Newsday Inter-
view with Michael Lebron, NEWSDAY (City Edition), Feb. 11, 1993, at 123.
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Transportation Displays, Inc. ("TDI"), an agent of National Rail-
road Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak"), to rent the Spectacular, a
"curved, back-lit display space approximately 103 feet wide by
ten feet high" on the west wall of the rotunda on the upper level
of Pennsylvania Station ("Penn Station").17 The terms of the con-
tract reserved to TDI the right to terminate the contract at any
time without notice should "[Amtrak] deem such advertising ob-
jectionable for any reason."8 When Lebron submitted his pro-
posed advertisement, 9 a large work comprised of pictures and
text, criticizing the makers of Coors beer for their involvement in
and support of right-wing political causes,' ° Amtrak refused to
run the display stating that "[Amtrak's] policy is that it will not
allow political advertising on the [Sipectacular advertising
sign.
" 21
The public forum doctrine requires that one first deter-
mine the relevant forum under discussion, categorize it as one of
the three types of fora, and finally apply the appropriate analy-
sis. 22 Circuit Judge Mahoney, writing for the court, held that the
relevant forum for public forum doctrine analysis was the Spec-
tacular, the single billboard for which Lebron contracted.' Be-
" Lebron, 69 F.3d at 653. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that the Spectacular
is a "unique advertising location in the City of New York." Id.
'8 Id. at 653.
'9 Id. at 656. Lebron described his advertisement as social realism for
"consumer, corporatist society." Todd S. Purdum, At Home with Michael Lebron,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at C1.20 The Coors family has been "denounced as racist, sexist, union-bashing, right-
wing fanatics." Bella Stumbo, Brewing Controversy Coors Clan, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1988, at 1. Joseph Coors, a long-time friend of Ronald Reagan and one of the
controlling members of the Coors family, has made substantial contributions to such
right-wing causes as the John Birch Society, the Heritage Foundation, and groups
opposing the equal rights amendment. Id. One of his most controversial contribu-
tions was a personal donation of a $65,000 airplane to the Nicaraguan "freedom
fighters," an act for which he received an invitation to testify at the Iran-Contra
hearings. Id.
21 Lebron, 69 F.3d at 654. Lebron contended that, although he never discussed
in depth the precise subject matter of his artwork, he did inform TDI at the time of
the contract that his work was generally political. Id. at 653.
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(providing detailed description of public forum doctrine requirements).
23 Lebron, 69 F. 3d at 655. The court relied on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, in holding the court should restrict its public forum
analysis to consideration of the Spectacular billboard alone rather than the sum to-
tal of advertising space in Penn Station. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 655 (citing Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 802). In Cornelius, the Supreme Court held that the forum to be consid-
ered in plaintiffs challenge of its restriction from participation in a fundraising
[Vol: 70:609
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cause Amtrak had never before run a political advertisement on
the Spectacular,24 the court concluded that the Spectacular was
"most likely ... a nonpublic forum."25 The court consequently
found that Amtrak's rejection of Lebron's advertisement was
permissible as a viewpoint-neutral decision based on the subject
matter and not the content of the advertisement.26 The court
then decided that Amtrak's decision to reject all political adver-
tisements was reasonable in light of Amtrak's interest in avoid-
ing controversy and embarrassment. 7
In his dissent, Chief Judge Newman argued that the ma-
jority erred in concluding that the Spectacular was the proper fo-
rum for analysis.' He claimed that "[n]o prior case has taken
such a restricted view of the relevant forum."9 He therefore
concluded that the appropriate forum for consideration was the
rotunda,0 the central area of Penn Station of which the Spec-
drive in the federal workplace was the fundraising drive only and not the workplace
generally. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. The Lebron court also focused on the Spec-
tacular's "unique size, location, and visibility" and the fact that this was the only
advertising venue to which Lebron sought access and Lebron's refusal to accept any
alternative space offered by TDI. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 655.
24 The court refers to the Spectacular's 26-year history, during which the bill-
board had only been used for the display of commercial advertisements. Lebron, 69
F.3d at 654.
Id. at 656. The court's public forum doctrine analysis cites Cornelius, 473 U.S.
788, and Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that
municipal sports stadium was "non-public forum where the City may make reason-
able restrictions on expression."), but the court seems to rush to the conclusion that
the Spectacular was a nonpublic forum without articulating its reasoning in support
of this categorization. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 656.
26 Lebron, 69 F.3d at 656.
2' Id. The court relied on a 1974 decision by the Supreme Court, Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), for the proposition that a public entity engaged
in commerce may limit the type of advertising it chooses to display as long as its
choices are reasonable and its policies and practices are not "arbitrary, capricious,
or invidious." Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.
2" Lebron, 69 F.3d at 660 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
2 Id. Newman discussed the facts of Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, and indicated that
the relevant focus in defining the scope of the forum is the "particular means of
communication." Lebron, 69 F.3d at 660 (Newman, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801). Newman went on to discuss Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 37, because Cornelius relied on Perry's
holding that the forum was the school district's interschool mail system, not the
teachers' individual mailboxes, nor the mailboxes of one school within the district.
Lebron, 69 F.3d at 660 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). Similarly, Newman contended
that in Lehman, the analysis was confined to the advertising space on city-owned
buses and not solely the space on one bus. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661 (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).3' Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
19961
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tacular forms one wall.3 Rather than focus on the specific bill-
board for which Lebron contracted, Newman sought to define as
Lebron's forum "the means of communication to which Lebron
sought access."32 Clearly, Lebron sought access to the rotunda.
Newman stated that, once the forum was properly defined, the
unconstitutionality of Amtrak's refusal to accept Lebron's art-
work was clear.33 Because Amtrak had leased space in the ro-
tunda to The Plain Truth, "a magazine ... devoted to 'political
and social issues,"'34 Newman argued that Amtrak should have
been foreclosed from denying Lebron access to this same adver-
tising venue since his advertisement carried a similar message.35
Newman further argued that, even if the court was correct limit-
ing the forum to the Spectacular, it erred in focusing solely on
Amtrak's past practices to determine the nature of the forum.
Rather, the appropriate analysis required consideration of both
"policy and practice."36 This consideration led Chief Judge New-
man to conclude that Amtrak's policy with respect to political
advertisements was "unwritten, unclear, and undisseminated."37
3' Id. "[Plublic forum analysis cannot be so particularized as to focus on one of
several billboards on government property, no matter how preferable that one bill-
board's size and location may be to an advertiser." Id. Judge Newman argues that,
although the two billboards on the north and south walls of the rotunda were
smaller in size than the Spectacular, it was inconceivable that, were one political
party allowed to run a political advertisement on either of those walls, a competing
political party would be denied access to the Spectacular for the same purpose. Id.
12 Id. at 661.
3Id.
3Id. (quoting majority opinion).3* Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661. "It is clearly unconstitutional for Amtrak to permit its
advertising space in the rotunda to be used to convey the message of The Plain
Truth and deny space in the same rotunda to the message that Lebron believes con-
veys the plain truth about the brewers of Coors beer." Id.
" Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, and citing Lehman, 488 U.S. at 303).
37 Lebron, 69 F.3d at 662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). Newman pieced together
Amtrak's policy by considering: the language of the agreement between Amtrak and
TDI, the district court's finding that "neither [of the] key Amtrak official[s] respon-
sible for supervising Amtrak's arrangements with TDI ... knew of any prohibition on
political advertising at any of Amtrak's facilities.... other key Amtrak officials could
not agree on what Amtrak's policy was," and TDI's guidelines "do not prohibit politi-
cal advertisements" but label them commercial. Id. at 661-62. The relevant language
of the contract between Amtrak and TDI stated: "All advertising material, exhibit
material, notices and advertisements, and their manner of presentation and design,
shall be subject to approval by Amtrak, which may disapprove any such items at its
own discretion." Id. (quoting in Lebron, 811 F. Supp. 993, 1002). Newman stated
that, "[ilt is difficult to imagine a more standardless statement of policy." Id. When
asked for an explanation of the stated policy, one key Amtrak official "testified that
the policy prohibited only those advertisements that were both 'political and divisive
[Vol: 70:609
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As such, it provided "ample basis for the [district court's] ulti-
mate conclusion that the policy permitted the unfettered exercise
of discretion and created the risk of abuse that the First
Amendment prohibits."38
Newman considered an additional argument not addressed
by the majority: namely, that Amtrak's willingness to accept an
advertisement encouraging the purchase of Coors beer rendered
its refusal to accept Lebron's advertisement discouraging that
purchase a content-based restriction on plaintiffs First Amend-
ment rights.39 Choosing not to reach the issue, however, New-
man instead determined that issues previously addressed re-
solved the dispute in Lebron's favor."
It is submitted that the majority erred both in its defini-
tion and categorization of the relevant forum. Its restriction of
the forum analysis to the Spectacular seems to indicate a result-
oriented approach, particularly because the court seemed to en-
gage in little analysis beyond its initial inquiry into the past
leasing practices of the Spectacular. It is further submitted that
the dissent reached the correct conclusion, but erred in limiting
its public forum doctrine analysis solely to considering whether
Amtrak engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Part I of this Comment discusses the current status of the
or objectionable,' while another could not say what the policy meant." Id.
"8 Lebron, 69 F.3d at 662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). Newman provides a full
discussion of why a government actor's stated policy must limit its discretion to ac-
cept or reject advertisements:
[W]here a policy is unwritten, unclear, and undisseminated, the fact that it
has not yet been used discriminatorily does not save it from invalidation
under the First Amendment. The vice of conferring unfettered discretion
on government officials to determine which messages may be conveyed is
not avoided by their past pattern of not making a discriminatory decision.
The vice inheres in the opportunity for discrimination, and the First
Amendment requires that opportunity to be held to an acceptable mini-
mum by a clear and well understood policy that appropriately limits the
discretion of the officials who must administer it.
Id. Newman quoted the Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S.
1030, 1051 (1991) as stating, "The question is not whether discriminatory enforce-
ment occurred here, and we assume it did not, but whether the Rule is so imprecise
that discriminatory enforcement is a real possibility." Lebron, 69 F.3d at 662
(Newman, C.J., dissenting).
'9 Id. The majority characterized Lebron's viewpoint discrimination argument
"plainly specious." Id. at 659 n.4.
40 Id. at 663 (Newman, C.J. dissenting) ("I need not decide whether to accept
Lebron's argument since his other positions are well supported on this record."). The
majority quoted Lebron as claiming, "I do not seek to sell anything other than ideas
with this advertisement," in finding his argument sophistical. Id. at 659 n.4.
1996]
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public forum doctrine and suggests that the Lebron court mis-
applied the doctrine. It concludes that, within the context of
proper public forum doctrine analysis, the means of communica-
tion to which the plaintiff sought access was a designated public
forum. Part II analyzes the restriction placed on plaintiffs
speech and asserts that the policy was, on its face and as ap-
plied, content and viewpoint based and, therefore, should have
received strict scrutiny. It suggests that Amtrak's stated policy
represented an impermissible infringement on the right to free
speech because it granted Amtrak officials unfettered discretion
in choosing which advertisements to accept or reject.
I. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. The Current State of Public Forum Doctrine Analysis
In recent years, the Supreme Court's application of the
public forum doctrine has come under attack by critics who claim
it has been used as a device to curtail the right to free speech.41
For example, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Inc. ,42 the Court held constitutional the government's
decision to exclude certain groups from an organized charity
drive aimed at federal employees and held in a federal work-
place.43 The Court defined the relevant forum to be the Com-
bined Federal Campaign ("CFC")." It concluded that a consid-
eration of CFC's past practices and policies45 revealed that CFC
41 See David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143
(1993) (discussing Court's erosion of right to free speech, focusing on Court's plural-
ity opinion in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)); see also United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Ironically, these
public forum categories-originally conceived of as a way of preserving First
Amendment rights ... -have been used in some of our recent decisions as a means
of upholding restrictions on speech.") (emphasis in original); LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993 (2d ed. 1988) (providing general discussion of
why public forum doctrine "can leave speech inadequately protected"); C. Thomas
Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis,
55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986) (discussing how application of public forum
doctrine results in situations in which "free speech values tend to be minimized or
ignored; government interests tend to be emphasized and exaggerated.").
42 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
43Id. at 808.
4 Id. at 801 ("The CFC is an annual charitable fundraising drive conducted in
the federal workplace during working hours largely through the voluntary efforts of
federal employees.").
4 Id. at 804. Such past practices and policy include an executive order indicat-
[Vol: 70:609
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was a nonpublic forum.46 Therefore, the government only needed
to show that its decision to exclude the petitioners from the CFC
was viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of its purpose."
Similarly, in Perry Educators' Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association,48 the Court held constitutional a school
district's refusal to grant the plaintiff, Perry Local Educators'
Association ("PLEA"), an outside teachers' union, access to the
school mail system. The school district refused access to PLEA
while it granted such access to the teachers union with whom
the teachers in the school district had contracted.49 The Court
identified the school mail system as the relevant forum50 and
found that the policy and practices of the school district with re-
gard to the mail system51 indicated that the mail facilities consti-
ing that the CFC was open to "national voluntary health and welfare agencies and
such other national voluntary agencies as may be appropriate." Id. at 792 (quoting
Exec. Order No. 10927, 3 C.F.R. 454 (1959-1963 Comp.)). In addition, the Civil Serv-
ice Commission's Manual on Fund-Raising limited participation to "[o]nly tax-
exempt, nonprofit charitable organizations that were supported by contributions
from the public and that provided direct health and welfare services to individuals."
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792 (quoting Manual on Fundraising § 5.21 (1977)).
" Id. at 805. The Court relied on the revised CFC Cameron which limited or-
ganizations to a single thirty word expression of their activities and purpose because
this limitation indicated a move away from previous more open fora. Id. The court
thus concluded that the governmenfs intention was to create selective access and
not a public forum. Id.
41 Id. at 806; see also supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text discussing various
levels of judicial scrutiny.
4" 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
'9 Id. at 55 (Brennan, J. dissenting). In his dissent, Brennan explained, "[tlhe
court today holds that an incumbent teachers' union may negotiate a collective-
bargaining agreement with a school board that grants the incumbent access to
teachers' mailboxes ... and denies such access to a rival union." Id. at 55-56.
'0 Id. at 47-48. The majority found the school's selective grant of access to cer-
tain civic and church organizations did not transform its internal mail system into a
public forum. Id. at 47.
r' The Court sidestepped the fact the school board had, in fact, changed its pol-
icy with regard to the mailboxes by focusing, instead, on the reason for the change
in policy:
PLEA ... points to its ability to use the school mailboxes and delivery sys-
tem on an equal footing with PEA prior to the collective-bargaining agree-
ment signed in 1978. Its argument appears to be that the access policy in
effect at that time converted the school mail facilities into a limited public
forum generally open for use by employee organizations, and that once this
occurred, exclusions of employee organizations thereafter must be judged
by the constitutional standard applicable to public forums. The fallacy in
the argument is that it is not the forum, but PLEA itself, which has
changed. Prior to 1977, there was no exclusive representative for the Perry
School District teachers.... Therefore, the ... policy of allowing both organi-
zations to use the school mail facilities simply reflected the fact that both
1996]
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tuted a nonpublic forum." The Court concluded, therefore, that
the denial of access to the nonpublic forum was constitutional, as
it constituted a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral decision restric-
tion.53
Last year, however, in Rosenberger v. Rector of University
of Virginia54 and Capitol Square Review v. Pinette,55 the Court
found two bans on free speech unconstitutional. In Rosenberger,
the University of Virginia refused to allocate to a Christian stu-
dent group money from the Student Activities Fund ("SAF") for
the printing of their student newspaper, Wide Awake. The
school had distributed SAF guidelines which prohibited the use
of SAF funds for any student activity which "primarily promotes
or manifests a particular belie[fl in or about a deity or an ulti-
mate reality."56 Although the students brought their claims un-
der both the Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment, 7 the Court's analysis of the free speech claim ex-
tended only to a discussion of viewpoint discrimination and did
not focus on the public forum doctrine.58 Because the school had
unions represented the teachers and had legitimate reasons for use of the
system.... [and the policy] did not constitute creation of a public forum in
any broader sense.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 48. This argument seems to indicate that there is nothing to be
learned by looking at past policy and practices in determining the proper classifica-
tion of the forum because, clearly, as long as the government has chosen to change
its policy and provides reasons for doing so, the forum can be deemed reclassified for
purposes of public forum doctrine analysis. Further, it seems odd that in Perry, the
Court's willingness to go through the motions of public forum analysis renders it in-
capable of recognizing the viewpoint discrimination inherent in the school district's
refusal to allow PLEA access to the school mail system it makes readily available to
a competing union. "In focusing on the public forum issue, the Court disregards the
First Amendment's central proscription against censorship, in the form of viewpoint
discrimination, in any forum, public or nonpublic." Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).i 2 Id. at 46; see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-67. The dissent, meanwhile, saw this more as an equal
access claim than a public forum claim. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding
clear viewpoint discrimination).
'4 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515 (quoting University of Virginia Guidelines
governing SAF).
17 Id.; see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text discussing various clauses of
the First Amendment.
"s Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-20. As part of this failure to focus, the Court
cited Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384
(1993), to impliedly conclude that the University's policy created a forum from
which it could exclude one group over another. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
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extended money for printing to publications espousing other
groups' views, the Court found that the school's denial of money
to this group for the same purpose constituted impermissible
discrimination on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint.59 In its
analysis of the school's Establishment Clause defense, the Court
determined that a viewpoint-neutral disbursement of school
money that did not favor the religious group over other student
groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.0 The Court
thus held that the school's adherence to the Establishment
Clause did not require that it proscribe the student group's right
of free speech and, so, Establishment Clause concerns could not
serve as a basis for that proscription.61
Similarly, in Capitol Square Review," both Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clause issues were raised. There, the gov-
ernment had designated public grounds for use as a public fo-
rum, but denied a request by the Ku Klux Klan for permission to
erect a free-standing cross on Capitol Square during the Decem-
ber holiday season.63 The Court held that, here too, the restric-
tion on petitioners' speech was not constitutionally permissible
and that allowing such speech did not constitute a violation of
the Establishment Clause.' The holding here rests on the clear
19 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517-18. The Court then turned to the question of
whether the Establishment Clause's prohibition on governmental endorsement of
religion offered sufficient basis for this governmental violation of the students' right
to free speech. Id. at 2520. The Court found that it did not, since the disbursement
of this money constituted a neutral expenditure which conferred on this group no
greater benefit than that conferred on any other student group. Id. at 2532-33.60 Id. at 2525. The Court indicated that "there is no real likelihood that the
speech in question is being either endorsed or coerced by the State." Id. at 2523. It
further stressed the fact that "[any benefit to religion is incidental to the govern-
ment's provision of secular services for secular purposes on a religion-neutral basis.
Printing is a routine, secular, and recurring attribute of student life." Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. at 2524.
6' Id. at 2525. The Court goes even further in stating that the school's attempt
to regulate the speech of the student group created the risk of "fostering a pervasive
bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Estab-
lishment Clause requires." Id.
115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
Id. at 2445. Capitol Square was a state-owned, ten-acre, parcel of land sur-
rounding the state capitol in Ohio. Id. at 2444. It is widely used by political activists
and religious groups. Id. In November 1993, the Capitol Square Review and Advi-
sory Board authorized the state to erect its annual Christmas tree. Id. at 2445.
Similarly, the Board granted a rabbi's request to erect a menorah. Id. Soon after,
the Board denied the Ku Klux Klan's request to erect a Latin Cross in Capitol
Square. Id.
" Id. at 2450 ("Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause
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statement by the government of its intent to create a public fo-
rum;" such clear intent left the Court no alternative but to re-
gard Capitol Square as such. Therefore, while a victory for the
Ku Klux Klan, the holding in this case offers no real indication of
whether the Court will alter its treatment of less clearly estab-
lished public fora, or widen the scope of its public forum analysis.
As a result, Capitol Square Review, like Rosenberger, offers little
cause for celebration among supporters of the right to free
speech.
B. The Lebron Court's Misuse of the Public Forum Doctrine
Even within the context of the limitations which have been
placed on the right to free speech, the majority's public forum
doctrine analysis in Lebron was fundamentally unsound. In Le-
bron, the majority simply classified the Spectacular as "most
likely ... a nonpublic forum."66 The dissent did not even reach
the issue of classification, as its definition of the forum resulted
in its clear recognition that Amtrak practiced viewpoint dis-
crimination, eliminating the need to inquire into whether the ro-
tunda was a public or nonpublic forum.67 It is maintained that
the superficial public forum doctrine analysis engaged in both
opinions is representative of the level of judicial analysis which
where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public fo-
rum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms. Those conditions are satis-
fied here; therefore, the state may not bar respondent's cross from Capitol Square.").
' Id. at 2444. Even a court reluctant to recognize designated public fora could
not disregard the clear intent exhibited by the government in creating Capitol
Square:
Capitol Square is a 10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the Statehouse
in Columbus, Ohio. For over a century the square has been used for public
speeches, gatherings, and festivals advocating and celebrating a variety of
causes, both secular and religious. Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4-02(A)
(1994) makes the square available "for use by the public ... for free discus-
sion of public questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose" and
[another Ohio statute] gives the Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board responsibility for regulating public access. To use the square, a
group must simply fill out an official application form and meet several cri-
teria, which concern primarily safety, sanitation, and non-interference
with other uses of the square, and which are neutral as to the speech con-
tent of the proposed event.
Id. (citations omitted). Armed with 100 years of past practices and two statutes de-
claring the square open to the public for all forms of expression, the Court was left
with no choice but to classify the square as a public forum.
66 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 656 (2nd Cir.
1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
67 Id. at 661 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
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is placing the First Amendment right to free speech in jeopardy."
The court's failure to even classify the forum as either a nonpub-
lic or designated public forum69 creates the implicit impression
that an individual's speech is only protected in a traditional
public forum.
The Lebron court mistakenly relied on Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights," in which a candidate for public office chal-
lenged a city ban on political advertisements on buses.7 There,
the court held that, even though commercial and public service
advertisements were permitted on buses, the city's decision to
reject plaintiffs campaign advertisements was constitutional be-
cause it was reasonable in light of the governmental actor's pur-
pose.72 The inclusion of a lengthy quote from Lehman in the text
of the Lebron majority opinion,73 however, only serves to high-
light the dissimilarities between the cases. The Lehman court
stressed that city buses bore no resemblance to a traditional
public forum: "we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park,
street corner, or other public thoroughfare."' Penn Station, on
the other hand, largely resembles a traditional public forum and
serves as a thoroughfare." It is a public terminal through which
thousands of people pass each day; it serves as a meeting place
for commuters; it serves as a conduit through which people pass
to get from one outside sidewalk to another. Thus, if one were to
follow the reasoning in Lehman, while Penn Station may not be
a traditional public forum, it could certainly be categorized as a
designated public forum and, therefore, would be entitled to the
same level of scrutiny.76
' See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 821 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing Court's misuse of public forum doctrine,
stating, "([rather than taking the nature of the property into account in balancing
the First Amendment interests of the speaker and society's interests in freedom of
speech against the interests served by reserving the property to its normal use, the
Court simply labels the property and dispenses with the balancing.").
Lebron, 69 F.3d at 656.
7o 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
7' Lebron, 69 F.3d at 657.
72 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04.
7" Lebron, 69 F.3d at 656-57.
74 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.
75 Webster's Dictionary defines "thoroughfare" as "a way or place for passage,
a street open at both ends, ... [or] a main road ... passage, transit." WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 1228 (1989).
76 The governmenfs intent determines if a forum is a designated public forum.
Cornelius v. NAACP Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); see Day, supra
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Moreover, the Lehman court offered, as a basis for its
judgment, its determination that "[tihe city consciously has lim-
ited access to its transit system advertising space in order to
minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the
risk of imposing upon a captive audience."77 While the city in
Lehman had a well articulated, clear policy regarding its prohi-
bition against political advertising," the same cannot be said of
Amtrak. In fact, even the Amtrak officials charged with the en-
forcement of the policy did not exhibit any clear knowledge or
understanding of that policy.79
C. The Relevant Forum and Its Proper Categorization as a
Designated Public Forum
A proper analysis requires that a court not only look at pol-
icy and past practices to determine whether and to what extent
the government had opened a forum for expression, but that it
then follow the analysis through to its conclusion and inquire
into the boundaries of that forum and whether the speech at is-
sue falls within those boundaries." Such an analysis required
the Lebron court to engage in a balancing test to determine
whether Amtrak's interest in avoiding controversy was sufficient
to warrant the violation of plaintiffs right to be heard." It is
suggested that the Lebron majority failed to address adequately
Air Line Pilots Association International v. Department of Avia-
note 41, at 177. For analysis purposes, the forum begins with a "presumption of
openness." Id. at 178. Thereafter, it is incumbent upon the government to establish
that it intended to close the forum and thereby overcome the presumption. Id.
7' Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 299. The city's agreement with Metromedia, Inc., an advertising space
rental agent, included a clear provision which stated explicitly that Metromedia
"shall not place [plolitical advertising in or upon ... or about any ... space granted
hereunder." Id. The city also provided Metromedia with a written statement of its
policy, which states that "[p]olitical advertisements will not be accepted on [the
listed transit systems]." Id. at 300 n.1 (emphasis added).
79 Lebron, 69 F.3d at 662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
SO Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
"Lebron, 69 F.3d at 658. The only discussion devoted to this type of analysis
indicates that "Amtrak's decision, as a proprietor, to decline to enter the political
arena, even indirectly, by displaying political advertisements is certainly reason-
able.... [It is] highly advisable to avoid the criticism and the embarrassments of al-
lowing any display seeming to favor any political view." Id. Here, the court supports
Amtrak's reasons for wanting to avoid accepting political advertising without articu-
lating what those reasons are. Further, if one were to follow the court's reasoning to
its eventual conclusion, the mere fact that an advertisement is controversial will
render it avoidable.
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tion of Chicago,"2 which presented a factual setting substantially
similar to Lebron and offered sound analysis that should have
been applied.
In Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Line Pilots Association
("ALPA"), the collective bargaining representative for Air Wis-
consin, challenged the Department of Aviation's ("DA") refusal to
allow ALPA to place an advertisement honoring the Air Wiscon-
sin pilots 3 in one of the diorama display cases at O'Hare air-
port.' At the time that ALPA and Transportation Media Inc.
("TMI"), DA's agent for the lease of diorama display cases, en-
tered into a contract to rent the space, TMI did not know the
content of the advertisement."5 The contract contained a clause
granting the Commissioner of Aviation the right to remove any
advertisements deemed "unaesthetic or objectionable for any
reason whatsoever." 6 Hours after the diorama was installed,
TMI removed it. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit defined the relevant forum to be the advertising
space within the airport rather than the airport as a whole."8
The court then set out what it believed to be the proper frame-
work for deciding the categorization of the relevant forum as
traditional public, designated public, or nonpublic. According to
the Seventh Circuit, a court should look at the government's in-
tent in establishing and maintaining the forum. 9 In determining
the intent, two factors should be focused on: first, "the policy and
practice of the government with respect to the property"; and,
second, "the nature of the property and its compatibility with ex-
-2 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995). Because this was an appeal from a dismissal of
plaintiffs claim, the lower court did not engage in findings of fact. As a result, in
some instances, the court is unable to come to conclusions because of the insuffi-
cieny of the record.
Although the advertisement could be viewed as honoring Air Wisconsin pilots,
it also constituted an attack on United Air Lines; It expressly blamed United for
selling off pieces of its company, resulting in increased unemployment throughout




Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 45 F.3d at 1148.
"Id. at 1152. "[Clhannels for public communication ... may well exist within
the greater piece of government property. This much is true here. Because ALPA
sought access to the advertising space and not to the airport as a whole, the adver-
tising space is the proper focus of forum analysis." Id.
83 Id.
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pressive activity."9°
An examination of Lebron's claim within the preceding
public forum doctrine analysis reveals that the majority in Le-
bron erred in defining the Spectacular as the relevant forum.
The court based its decision on the fact that the Spectacular is
the sole billboard to which Lebron sought access. 9 If this were
accepted as the appropriate determining factor in defining the
relevant forum, it would result in a requirement that every bill-
board in Penn Station be evaluated independently. Such a re-
quirement would lead to the absurd result, that on the same
wall, two otherwise equivalent advertisement spaces could be
distinguished from each other by the advertisements each previ-
ously carried, resulting in one being characterized as a public fo-
rum and the other as a nonpublic forum. Further, should Am-
trak wish to maintain the established character of the fora, it
would have to make decisions regarding which advertisements to
accept based on the number of public fora it had available at the
time to carry those announcements. Such a result is clearly un-
workable and ludicrous but is, nonetheless, the logical result of
the reasoning used by the majority.
A far more practical approach is to characterize the relevant
forum based on the "access sought by the speaker."92 Clearly,
Lebron sought only to display his advertisement on the Spectacu-
lar; however, much of the value attached to that venue may be
attributed to its location in the rotunda, the portion of Penn
Station through which many commuters pass, thereby permit-
ting his expression to receive the greatest exposure.93 Hence, the
relevant forum in Lebron was the rotunda, not the Spectacular.94
To characterize the rotunda, therefore, the court should have
considered Amtrak's past practices and policy with regard to ac-
cepting advertisements within the rotunda as a whole.95 Since
Amtrak accepted an advertisement of a political nature in the ro-
90Id.
9' Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 655 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
92 Cornelius v. NAACP Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 778, 801 (1985); Air Line
Asso'n Int'l, 45 F.3d at 1151.
"3 See Richard Perez-Pena, Amtrak Sued Over Barring of Billboard, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1992, at B1.
"Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
95 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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tunda,96 its refusal to run Lebron's advertisement constituted
viewpoint discrimination. As a result, there would be no need to
inquire further into the boundaries of the forum, since, by ac-
cepting the advertising of The Plain Truth, Amtrak had opened
the forum to political advertising. Thus, Amtrak had, at mini-
mum, opened the rotunda up as a designated public forum.97
II. THE APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS APPLICABLE TO AMTRAK'S
STATED POLICY
In light of the conclusion that the rotunda in Penn Station
was a designated public forum in Part I of this Comment, it is
submitted that Amtrak's policy prohibiting political advertising
in the Spectacular should have been held to be unconstitutional
on its face and as applied. In examining a government policy
that restricts speech on government property, a court should
consider several factors: first, the past content of the relevant fo-
rum;98 second, the standards to which the official making the de-
termination must adhere;99 and third, the consistency with which
such determinations are made.' It is asserted that the Lebron
court should have applied this analysis, as did the court in AIDS
Action Committee of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority.'01
In AIDS Action Committee, the AIDS Action Committee of
Massachusetts, Inc. ("AAC"). °. submitted seven proposed public
service announcements to the Massachusetts Bay Transport
Authority ("MBTA") for display.1 3 The MBTA objected to the
content of the advertisements,' which "included headlines and
copy which, to varying degrees, involved the use of sexual innu-
9 The Plain Truth is a free magazine on political and social issues distributed at
a 7-foot kiosk positioned in front of the Spectacular. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 654. The ki-
osk also displays an advertisement for the magazine. Id.
97 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
"See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 45 F.3d at 1155.
See id.
See id.
1'0 42 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
'C2 AAC is a "not for-profit corporation which includes among its main purposes
AIDS education of the general public, individuals at high risk of HIV infection, and
health care professionals." Id. at 3.
103 Id.
10 Each of the ads contained a large color picture of a condom wrapped in a
package and stated that latex condoms were an effective means of preventing the
transmission of HIV. Id.
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endo and double entendre."15 Despite its previous objections, the
MBTA eventually ran all seven announcements and, as a result,
received a significant number of complaints."6 Shortly after this
response, the MBTA issued its Commercial and Public Service
Advertising Policy, which provided guidelines regarding accept-
able advertising. 7 AAC subsequently submitted another sug-
gestive advertising campaign"0 8 which the MBTA, after much de-
bate, refused to run unless ACC agreed to edit the
advertisements to conform to the acceptable standards.' 9 Con-
temporaneously, however, the MBTA accepted and ran two ad-
vertisements for the movie "Fatal Instinct," both of which con-
tained suggestive pictures and language."0 The court held that
the MBTA's prohibition on AAC's use of sexually explicit lan-
guage was unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination in
light of the MBTA's acceptance of an equally explicit advertise-
ment for "Fatal Instinct.""'
In AIDS Action Committee, the MBTA had constructed a
written policy in direct response to the controversy created by
the display of the plaintiffs prior advertisements. This policy
included the following guidelines: the advertising must meet
minimum requirements "with respect to good taste, decency and
community standards as determined by the Authority; " 1 2 the ad-
vertisement must not "appeal to a prurient interest;""' the ad-
1os Id.
" AIDS Action Comm., 42 F.3d at 3.
107 Id.
108 These advertisements each contained a picture of a condom, endorsed the use
of condoms for the prevention of the spread of AIDS, and included the AAC hotline
phone number. They also, however, contained some suggestive language. For ex-
ample, one ad maintained that a condom "will make you 1/1000th of an inch larger."
Another encouraged readers to "[tlell him you don't know how it will ever fit." Id. at
4. lo9 Id. at 4-5.
11o Id. These advertisements each "prominently featured" the bare, crossed legs
of a seated woman. One ad displayed the headline "Opening Soon" across the
woman's crotch. Id. at 5.
i The court skipped over any public forum doctrine analysis stating that the
record before it was poorly developed and, therefore, facts that it might find neces-
sary for such were not available for its review. AIDS Action Comm., 42 F.3d at 9.
The court did not want to make determinations absent relevant information such as
when or whether the advertising policy went into effect, particularly as it found the
viewpoint discrimination issue dispositive. Id. at 9-10. Furthermore, the court de-
scribed the public forum doctrine analysis as having a "relative murky status." Id.




vertisement "must not describe, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct;""4 advertising "containing messages or graphic rep-
resentations pertaining to sexual conduct will not be accepted."
115
In attempting to ascertain whether this policy was in fact ap-
plied by the MBTA, the court noted that, when plaintiff pre-
sented the MBTA with its second advertising campaign, plaintiff
received from the MBTA "four different and contradictory con-
clusions regarding the acceptability" of the ads."6 Further, at no
time during its discussions with AAC did the MBTA mention its
policy and, in the course of the litigation, the MBTA made no di-
rect references to its policy until it submitted its reply brief.
117
This led the court to conclude that the MBTA policy was, on its
face and as applied, not content-neutral."8
It is submitted that the Lebron court should have engaged
in somewhat similar analysis with regard to the Amtrak policy.
First, the Penn Station rotunda appeared to be open to indis-
criminate public speech. Hence, Amtrak's policy prohibiting use
of part of the rotunda, or the Spectacular, for political advertis-
ing was a content or subject-matter-based restriction. As the
policy can be seen as a content-based restriction in a fully open
designated public forum,' and Amtrak did not assert a compel-
ling government interest for this restriction," the policy should
have been held unconstitutional on its face. Second, even if the
rotunda was a more limited designated public forum, 1' previ-





" See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intl v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144,
1151 (7th Cir. 1995). (stating that government may open its property up for "all ex-
pressive activity"); see also Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir.
1986) (observing that "when the forum remains open as a whole it is governed by
the same standards as a traditional public forum.").
'2 The only interest asserted by Amtrak was its interest in avoiding controversy
and embarrassment. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 656.
'2 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 45 F.3d at 1151 (indicating that goverxment
may open property up for "more limited purposes such as use by certain groups...
or discussion of certain subjects."); see also Calash, 788 F.2d at 82 ("Limited public
forum for the use of certain speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects, the
First Amendment protections provided to traditional public forums only apply to
entities of a character similar to those entities the government admits to the fo-
rum.").
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ously permitted types of speech included political advertising, as
exemplified by the announcements for The Plain Truth. Lebron's
advertisement espoused political views and, therefore, fell within
the boundaries of permitted speech in the rotunda. Amtrak, by
selectively denying Lebron access to the forum based on his po-
litical views, engaged in impermissible viewpoint-based dis-
crimination.122 Furthermore, in analyzing the Amtrak policy un-
der the relevant factors applied by the AIDS Action Committee
court, one reaches the following conclusions regarding the ro-
tunda and Amtrak's policy: in the past, the relevant forum has
displayed political advertising, the applicable standards of Am-
trak's stated policy were unclear," and the policy was not ap-
plied consistently because the policy gave Amtrak officials unfet-
tered discretion.9'
CONCLUSION
The holding in Lebron seems to represent a further decay
of the right to free speech evident in recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. A close reading of Air Line Pilots Association and AIDS
Action Committee, however, indicates that this decay is neither
complete nor necessary. In both cases, the courts reached
speech-protective conclusions that were consistent with the
authorities relied on by the Lebron court. In so doing, they en-
gaged in a critical analysis which resulted in the type of fact-
sensitive balancing of rights necessary when a First Amendment
right is being proscribed. It is submitted that, had the Second
Circuit better defined the relevant forum and then applied the
appropriate public forum doctrine analysis, Mr. Lebron's right to
free expression would have been upheld.
Catherine Smith
122 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2516 (1995) (stating that, "[wihen the government targets not subject matter but
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amend-
ment is all the more blatant .... Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form
of content discrimination." (citations omitted)).
'2 See Lebron, 69 F.3d at 662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging that
Amtrak officials themselves did not have clear understanding of policy).
124 See supra notes 37, 38 and 79 and accompanying text.
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